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minimum contacts regardless of whether any property of the de-
fendant has been attached. Of course, separate objections would
still be appropriate when failure of service or improper attachment
is alleged. 17 4 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the proposed change
would lend consistency to jurisdictional pleading under the CPLR.
Richard H. Metsch
Relationship between premium finance agency and insurance
company is not sufficient to sustain a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation
The negligent misrepresentation cause of action permits recov-
ery for injuries arising out of justifiable reliance upon careless,
though innocent, statements.17 5 Although the cause of action read-
"" An objection to an attachment procedure, on grounds other than a failure of mini-
mum contacts among the forum, defendant and controversy, would seem warranted because
actual distinctions between quasi-in-rem and in personam actions still exist. See note 169
supra.
1, New York first recognized a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation in
Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). In Glanzer, the plaintiff entered into
an agreement to buy beans "in accordance with weight sheets certified by [the defendant]
public weighers," employed by the seller. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275. The plaintiffs paid for
the goods in reliance upon the certified weight measures, which proved to be inaccurate, and
sought to recover the overpayment from the public weighers. Id. Judge Cardozo, writing for
the majority, overcame the restrictions of privity and reasoned that when one acts pursuant
to an independent calling to control the conduct of another, the duty to act with care will
extend to "all whose conduct was to be governed," even if acting gratuitously. Id. at 239, 135
N.E. at 276.
Although the Court upheld the recovery "not merely for careless words ... but for the
careless performance of a service," id. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276 (citations omitted), the only
evidence of negligence was the inaccurate certificate itself, id.; see Green, The Communica-
tive Torts, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (1975), and, therefore, Glanzer is still considered the lead-
ing case on negligent misrepresentation. Note, Negligent Misrepresentation: Can an Attor-
ney Rely on What the Government Tells Him?, 40 LA. L. REv. 859, 860-63 (1980); see, e.g.,
White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977);
Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 377-78, 171 N.E. 574, 577-78 (1930);
Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 381, 157 N.E.
272, 273-74 (1927). In addition, Glanzer provided the basis for section 552 of the Second
Restatement of Torts on negligent misrepresentation. Green, supra, at 35. Under the Re-
statement, a person is liable for negligent misrepresentation if, "in the course of his business
- . . [he] supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions
... [and] he fails to exercise reasonable care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 552(1)
(1976). The Restatement differs from Glanzer only in that the former will not impose a duty
when the person is acting gratuitously. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) comment
c (1976); But see Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276 (1922) ("[i]t is an-
cient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become
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ily has been incorporated into the area of personal injury,178 courts
have been reluctant to extend its application to redress purely eco-
nomic loss.177 Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to speak care-
fully when the damages are limited to economic loss, requires proof
of a special relationship between the parties sufficient to justify ac-
tionable reliance. 78 Recently, in Home Mutual Insurance Co. v.
subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all"). For a discussion of the English
development of negligent misrepresentation, see Goodhart, Liability for Innocent but Negli-
gent Misrepresentations, 74 YALE L.J. 286, 287-94 (1964).
1M0 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 704 (4th ed. 1971). Since potential
liability is limited to a defined class of injured persons, the courts have had little trouble
applying negligent misrepresentation to personal injury cases. Id.; see Washington & Berke-
ley Bridge Co. v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 226 F. 169, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1915).
177 W. PROSSER, supra note 176, § 107, at 704-05. When recovery is sought for purely
economic harm, courts "have become alarmed" that a broad application of negligent misrep-
resentation potentially would lead to the unlimited liability of an indeterminate class. Id.;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1976). This problem was exemplified by
the factual situation surrounding the landmark case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In Ultramares, the plaintiff advanced money to the Stem
Company in reliance upon an inaccurate balance sheet prepared and certified by the defen-
dant public accountants who had been engaged by the Stern Company. Id. at 174-76, 174
N.E. at 442-43. The Court denied the plaintiff's recovery for negligent misrepresentation,
observing that although the defendants were aware that the certified balance sheets would
be relied upon by potential creditors, they did not know by whom or by how many. Id. at
173-74, 174 N.E. at 442. The Court reasoned that to impose a duty of care would subject the
defendants to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class." Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Judge
Cardozo distinguished the case from Glanzer by noting that the plaintiff's reliance in
Glanzer was "certain and immediate and deliberately willed," id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445,
whereas in Ultramares the plaintiff's reliance was "merely one possibility among many," id.
17s International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664, cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927). In International Products the Court of Appeals, per Judge
Andrews, set out the following four criteria for establishing a duty to speak with care:
There must be knowledge or its equivalent that the information is desired for a
serious purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that if
false or erroneous he will because of it be injured in person or property. Finally
the relationship of the parties, arising out of the contract or otherwise, must be
such that in morals and good conscience the one has the right to rely upon the
other for information, and the other giving the information owes a duty to give it
with care.
244 N.Y. at 338, 155 N.E. at 664 (citing Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N.Y. 511, 511, 139 N.E. 714,
714 (1923)).
In International Products, the plaintiff made arrangements with the defendant railroad
to have its goods received and stored by the defendant. 244 N.Y. at 333-34, 155 N.E. at 662.
In order to insure the goods once they were stored, the plaintiff asked the defendant at
which warehouse the goods were to be stored, and purchased his insurance based upon the
defendant's answer. Id. at 334, 155 N.E. at 662. In fact, only half the goods were stored at
that particular location, and the other half were stored at another dock which subsequently
caught fire, id. at 335, 155 N.E. at 663. Because of the misinformation given to the insurance
company, the plaintiff could not recover under the policy and, therefore, sought to recover
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Broadway Bank & Trust Co.,179 the Court of Appeals held that
when a defendant is not required to speak,180 but speaks to further
its own interests,181 an existing business relationship does not give
rise to a duty to speak with care, and thus no cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation arises. 82
In Home Mutual, the defendant bank, acting as a premium
finance ageniy,1 83 sent an ineffective notice of cancellation' to the
from the defendant on the theory of negligent misrepresentation. Id. Upholding the plain-
tiff's recovery, the International Products Court recognized the need to place limits on the
cause of action and, consequently, established the four criteria, see supra, to avoid imposing
liability for merely "casual response[s]" or "idle word[s]." Id. at 337, 155 N.E. at 664. These
criteria have since come to be recognized as the necessary elements of a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. See Cavallo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 682,
683, 312 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (2d Dep't 1970) (Hopkins, Acting P.J., dissenting); Advance Mu-
sic Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 268 App. Div. 707, 710-11, 53 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340-41 (1st
Dep't 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1947).
179 53 N.Y.2d 568, 428 N.E.2d 842, 444 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1981).
180 Id. at 574, 428 N.E.2d at 844, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
8 Id. at 575-76, 428 N.E.2d at 845, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
Id. at 571, 574-75, 428 N.E.2d at 843-44, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
1 The defendant bank was authorized to act as a premium finance agency under Arti-
cle XII-B of the New York Banking Law. Id. at 571-72, 428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at
437. In June of 1972, Shelva Ludwig entered into a premium finance agreement with the
Broadway Bank whereby the bank agreed to advance the full amount of Mrs. Ludwig's in-
surance premium to the plaintiff, Home Mutual Insurance Company, and Mrs. Ludwig
agreed to pay the premium and interest to the bank in monthly installments. Id. at 572, 428
N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
2- Id. at 572-73, 428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. Under section 576(1) of the
New York Banking Law, and the insurance contract, the defendant was given the exclusive
authority to cancel the policy if Mrs. Ludwig defaulted in her payments. Home Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Broadway Bank & Trust Co., 76 App. Div. 2d 24, 25, 429 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (4th Dep't
1980). Section 576(1) provides in part-
When a premium finance agreement contains a power of attorney or other
authority enabling the premium finance agency to cancel any insurance contract
or contracts listed in the agreement, the insurance contract or contracts shall not
be cancelled unless such cancellation is effectuated in accordance with the follow-
ing provisions:
(a) Not less than ten days written notice shall be mailed to the insured ...
and that at least three days for mailing such notice is added to the ten day notice.
N.Y. BANKING LAw § 576(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Mrs. Ludwig defaulted on her
July installment, and the bank, on July 21, 1972, sent her notice that her policy would be
cancelled on August 24, 1972. 53 N.Y.2d at 572, 428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The
bank, however, failed to check the box on the statement which signified that it was a cancel-
lation notice. Id. This was later determined, in Balboa Ins. Co. v. Widener, 47 App. Div. 2d
815, 815, 367 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1020 (4th Dep't 1975), to be an ineffective notice of cancella-
tion. 53 N.Y.2d at 573, 428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. On August 21, 1972, the
bank sent another notice of cancellation, with the appropriate box checked, but this too was
ineffective because it failed to give 10 days notice as required by section 576(1) of the New
York Banking Law. 76 App. Div. 2d at 25-27, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
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holder of an automobile insurance policy issued by the plaintiff in-
surance company.185 Upon receiving a copy of the notice, the insur-
ance company returned the unused portion of the premium to the
bank.186 The insured vehicle was subsequently involved in an
accident,187 and after a determination that the insurance policy
was still in effect,188 the plaintiff settled the damage claim for
$25,000.189 The insurance company brought an action against the
bank to recoup the settlement plus expenses, claiming that the
bank negligently misrepresented that the policy had been can-
celled.190 Finding the defendant liable, the trial court held that the
only damage proximately caused by this negligence was $243, the
amount of the refunded premium. 191 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, unanimously upheld the trial court's determi-
nation" 2 but reversed the lower court's finding that the bank owed
181 53 N.Y.2d at 572, 428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The plaintiff insurance
company issued the compulsory automobile insurance policy pursuant to the assigned risk
plan. Id.; see N.Y. INS. LAW § 63 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
188 53 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 428"N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. Instead of sending a
copy of the original cancellation notice, which did not properly state that it was a cancella-
tion notice, the bank sent the plaintiff a copy of the second cancellation notice. Id. at 572,
428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. That notice stated that it was a cancellation notice
and listed July 21, 1972, as its 'Original Date of Notice,' thereby purporting to have can-
celled the policy. Id. Accepting the defendant's cancellation notice as valid, the insurance
company sent a check for the unearned portion of the premium, $243, to the defendant and
Mrs. Ludwig's insurance broker. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Broadway Bank & Trust Co., 100
Misc. 2d 228, 230, 417 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1979).
18M The insured car was involved in an accident on September 21, 1972, approximately 1
month after the plaintiff had received a copy of the cancellation notice. 53 N.Y.2d at 573,
428 N.E.2d at 843, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 437. The accident resulted in personal injuries to a third
person. Id.
188 Balboa Ins. Co. v. Widener, 47 App. Div. 2d 815, 815, 367 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1020 (4th
Dep't 1975); see note 185 supra.
188 The plaintiff insurance company, which was required to defend the claim brought
against Mrs. Ludwig, settled for $25,000 after 1 day of trial. 100 Misc. 2d at 230, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 858.
180 53 N.Y.2d at 573, 428 N.E.2d at 843-44, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 837-38.
181 100 Misc. 2d at 234-36, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 860-62. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme
Court, Monroe County, first dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for negli-
gently attempting to cancel the policy, holding that since the defendant was not an agent of
the insurance company, it owed no duty to the insurer with respect to its performance under
the finance agreement. Id. at 230-32, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 858-59. Respecting the issue of negli-
gent misrepresentation, the court found that the relationship between the parties and the
facts of the case met the four criteria established in International Products, see note 178
supra. 100 Misc. 2d at 233-34, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 860. The court, however, reasoned that the
plaintiff's issuance of the insurance policy, and not the defendant's misrepresentation, was
the proximate cause of its settlement, and that the only consequence of the misrepresenta-
tion was the return of the unearned premium. Id. at 236, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
182 76 App. Div. 2d at 27, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court stated that the defendant was
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a duty to carefully represent that it had cancelled the policy.193
In affirming the appellate division, the Court of Appeals held
that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff with respect to its
settlement, and noted that the only act in reliance upon the defen-
dant's misrepresentation was the return of the premium.194 Writing
for a unanimous Court, Judge Jones stated that more than foresee-
ability is required to create a duty to speak with care. 5 Finding
that the defendant was under no contractual or legal obligation to
exercise its exclusive power to cancel the policy upon default, the
Court reasoned that there was no "special relationship" between
the parties sufficient to create a duty to speak carefully.196 Addi-
tionally, the Court concluded that the defendant did not assume a
duty by its voluntary action because it was acting on its own be-
half, rather than in the insurance company's interest. 97 Emphasiz-
ing the legislative intent in promoting premium finance agree-
ments, the Court further observed that the disparity between the
benefit to the defendant bank and the potential liability it would
be subjected to militated against finding a duty to speak with
care.198 Finally, Judge Jones stated that the insurance company's
not entitled to the return of the "unearned" premium because the policy had remained in
effect. Id.
19 Id. at 28, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 957. Distinguishing this case from International Products
and Glanzer, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that since the defendant was
not the insurance company's agent, it owed no duty and thus could not be liable for its
misrepresentations. Id.
94 53 N.Y.2d at 577-78, 428 N.E.2d at 846, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 440 (1981).
15 Id. at 576-77, 428 N.E.2d at 845-46, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 439-40. Quoting from Pulka v.
Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 785, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (1976), the
Court stated that foreseeability only defines the duty once one is found to exist, and that
the plaintiff failed to show the presence of such a duty. 53 N.Y.2d at 577, 428 N.E.2d at 846,
444 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
1" 53 N.Y.2d at 574-75, 428 N.E.2d at 844-45, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 438-39. Since the provi-
sion of the New York Banking Law which authorized the defendant to cancel the policy
upon default was enacted for the bank's benefit, and the choice to cancel was exclusively the
bank's, the Court held that the defendant had no duty to act. Id. at 575, 428 N.E.2d at 845,
444 N.Y.S.2d at 439. The Court distinguished the case at bar from White v. Guarente, 43
N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977), noting that White involved a contrac-
tual duty to perform the service whereas in the present case the defendant was under no
duty to act. 53 N.Y.2d at 575, 428 N.E.2d at 845, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
291 53 N.Y.2d at 575-76, 428 N.E.2d at 845, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 439. Addressing the plain-
tiff's claim that even if the defendant had no duty to act it assumed a duty to act carefully
when it chose to act, the Court noted that this principle has only been applied to "one
whose effort is extended for the purpose of aiding or serving another." Id. at 576, 428
N.E.2d at 845, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (citations omitted).
19 Id. at 577, 428 N.E.2d at 846, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 440. The Court reasoned that when
the minimal benefit to the premium finance agency is weighed against the potential liability,
19821
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only act in reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentation was to
return the unearned premium and, therefore, any recovery would
be limited to that amount.99
While the Home Mutual decision laudably effects the legisla-
ture's desire to promote premium finance agencies 200 by limiting
their potential liability to the amount of the premiums, 20 1 it is sub-
mitted that the Court's reasoning erroneously makes a duty to
speak with care contingent upon a duty to act.20 2 The failure to
banks would avoid entering into premium finance agreements. Id. Even if there was only a
small probability of being held liable, when faced with such a large potential liability, it is
doubtful that banks would be willing to take the risk. Indeed, it appears that, under such
circumstances, banks would be reluctant to enter into the premium finance agencies which
are so important in a compulsory insurance system. See note 200 infra.
19 53 N.Y.2d at 578-79, 428 N.E.2d at 846-47, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41.
10 Premium finance agreements have played a very important role in the overall
scheme of automobile insurance financing by providing an alternative method of financing
insurance premiums. Under the assigned risk plan, insurance companies which operate
within the state are required to participate in the pool and are compelled to issue automo-
bile insurance to persons who "are unable to procure insurance through ordinary methods."
N.Y. INs. LAW § 63(1) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1981-1982). This places a heavy burden on
insurance companies which are required to carry policies which they normally would not
issue. Premium finance agreements relieve some of this burden by allowing the insurance
company to receive the full amount of the premium upon issuing the policy. While premium
finance agreements existed prior to the legislature's enactment of Article XHI-B of the New
York Banking Law, their use was accompanied by many unethical and dishonest practices.
See generally 110 N.Y.S. SUPERINTENDANT OF BANKS ANN. REP. pt. 1, at 119 (1960). In en-
acting Article XII-B the legislature hoped to eliminate many of these abuses, thereby pre-
serving premium finance agencies as a viable option in automobile insurance financing. Id.
01 53 N.Y.2d at 578-79, 428 N.E.2d at 846-47, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41. The Home Mu-
tual Court's decision eliminated the possibility of a premium finance agency being held lia-
ble for benefits paid under a policy by holding as a matter of law that the relationship is not
sufficient to create a duty to speak with care. See note 196 and accompanying text supra. At
least one other court has summarily dismissed an action for negligent misrepresentation on
the grounds that the relationship between a premium finance agency and an insurance com-
pany is not sufficient to impose a duty to speak with care. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 79
App. Div. 2d 1022, 1022, 435 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (2d Dep't 1981) (relying on the appellate
division's opinion in Home Mutual).
102 The distinction between a duty to speak and a duty to speak with care appears, at
first, to be one of semantics. Speech used in the context of a representation, however, is
considered an "'act in the law.'" Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 241, 135 N.E. at 276-77
(citation omitted). Therefore, when the defendant owes the plaintiff a contractual duty to
speak, an action can be brought for negligent performance of the contractual duty. See
Tropwood A.G. v. Hempel's Marine Paints, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 1120, 1126-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Rozner v. Resolute Paper Prods. Corp., 37 App. Div. 2d 396, 398, 326 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46
(3d Dep't 1971). In Rozner, the court stated that "[a] contract may create a duty, not other-
wise existing, from which negligence may arise, but the negligence arises not because of a
breach in the contract but because of a failure to perform the contractual duty with care."
37 App. Div. 2d at 398, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 46. In addition to an action for negligent perform-
ance of a contractual duty, the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresenta-
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speak with care, however, alone is sufficient to uphold an action in
negligent misrepresentation.20 " A duty to speak carefully arises
from the relationship between the parties and not from a prior ob-ligation to act.20 4 While the defendant in Home Mutual was not
required to cancel the policy, the banking law should allow the
plaintiff insurance company to rely upon the bank's notice of can-
tion and infer the negligence from the misrepresentation itself, escaping the burden of prov-
ing specific acts of negligence. See International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. at 337,
155 N.E. at 664; Green, supra note 175, at 35. A duty to speak with care, however, can be
found when there is no duty to speak. For example, it can be imposed by law, see note 205
infra, or arise from the relationship between the parties, see notes 203 & 204 infra, even
though the person is speaking voluntarily. Additionally, contrary to the Home Mutual deci-
sion, it is not fatal to finding a duty to speak carefully that the one who speaks does so for
his own benefit. Cases which have required that the person speak for the benefit of another
in order to impose a duty to speak with care were not concerned with a pecuniary benefit,
but rather that the information be given for the purpose of guiding the conduct of another.
See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 241, 135 N.E. at 275.
Judge Cardozo recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between a duty to speak in the
first instance and the duty to speak with care, stating that "[tihe line of separation between
these diverse liabilities is difficult to draw." Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 241, 135 N.E. at
276. Nonetheless, he felt that the realities of the circumstances would bear out the distinc-
tion. Id.
203 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. at 184, 174 N.E. at 446. In International
Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927), for example, the Court allowed
the plaintiff to recover solely on the basis of negligent words. Id. at 338-39, 155 N.E. at 664.
Although the defendant in International Products had not yet become the bailee of the
plaintiff's property, or even entered into a definite contract with the plaintiff, id. at 334-35,
155 N.E. at 662-63, the Court held that the plaintiff owed the defendant a duty to speak
with care if it spoke at all, id. at 338-39, 155 N.E. at 664. Rather than straining the facts to
find a contractual duty to act, the Court based the duty to speak with care upon the general
relationship between the parties. Id. at 338-39, 155 N.E. at 664; see note 178 supra.
101 The crux of an action for negligent misrepresentation is that the defendant care-
lessly distributed information to those who could reasonably be expected to rely upon such
information to their detriment. See White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 362-63, 372 N.E.2d
315, 319, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
Therefore, rather than focusing upon the duty to act, courts have looked to the relationship
of the parties to ascertain whether it is sufficient to create a duty to speak with care. See
note 178 and accompanying text supra. In Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y.
369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930), for example, the Court upheld liability despite the lack of a duty
to act. Id. at 380, 171 N.E. at 578. In Doyle, the plaintiff purchased worthless bonds in
reliance upon the defendant's certification, which was both false and unauthorized. Id. at
371-75, 171 N.E. at 575-77. Noting that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to act,
id. at 374, 171 N.E. at 577, the Court upheld the plaintiff's recovery reasoning that "the
defendant knew that the certificates were desired for a serious purpose by persons who in-
tended to rely and act thereupon," id. at 379, 171 N.E. at 578. An even clearer example of
this would be International Products, wherein the Court upheld the action solely on the
relationship between the parties, expressly rejecting the possibility of setting any specific
requirement that the defendant must first have a duty to act. International Prods. Co. v.
Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. at 338, 155 N.E. at 664.
1982]
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cellation, thus giving rise to a duty to speak with care.2 0 5
Similarly, Home Mutual's holding, that one who acts voluntar-
ily is only subject to a duty to act with care if acting for the benefit
of another, appears to be contrary to the letter and logic of estab-
lished precedent. Generally, one who acts voluntarily may be sub-
ject to a duty to act with care, even if acting gratuitously.20a This
suggests that one who is acting voluntarily for his own benefit
would clearly be subject to a duty of care, and concomitantly, that
one who is acting for the benefit of another would be subject to a
similar duty.20 7 The equitable arguments against finding a duty are
205 See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 576(1)(d) (McKinney 1971). Under section 576(1)(d) of the
Banking Law the defendant bank had a duty to provide accurate information to the insur-
ance company if it chose to cancel the policy. This section reads in part:
A copy of such cancellation notice shall be sent to the insurer or insurers prior
to the effective date of cancellation containing a statement that it is a true copy of
the notice of cancellation served upon the insured or insureds, whereupon the in-
surance contract shall be cancelled with the same force and effect as if the afore-
said notice of cancellation had been submitted by the insured himself.
Id. It is suggested that this alone was sufficient to impose the duty to speak with care on the
defendant in Home Mutual. In discussing the requirements for finding a duty in an action
for negligent misrepresentation, courts have always held that this duty must exist by con-
tract, law, or otherwise. See note 178 supra.
206 See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276, wherein Judge Cardozo
stated the general principle that "[ilt is an ancient learning that one who assumes to act,
even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he
acts at all." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
207 The courts have apparently had little difficulty in upholding a negligent misrepre-
sentation cause of action when the person was acting for his own benefit. In Shea v. Teach-
ers' Retirement Sys., 51 App. Div. 2d 345, 381 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1st Dep't), dismissed on other
grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 836, 356 N.E.2d 290, 387 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976), for example, the court
upheld the action upon the basis that once the defendant chose to act it assumed a duty of
care. 51 App. Div. 2d at 348, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 269. In Shea, the defendant Teachers' Retire-
ment System provided information to the plaintiff's decedent regarding options under a
retirement plan. Id. at 347, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 268. Those options which were most beneficial
to the retiree, and least beneficial to the retirement system, were sufficiently obscured to
make the retiree reject her most desirable option. Id. at 348, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 269. In permit-
ting recovery, the Shea court only looked to the voluntary act and the reliance which could
be placed upon it. Id. While few courts have stated expressly the seemingly self-evident
principle in terms of one acting in his own interests, it is implicit in many of the cases. See,
e.g., Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 299 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1962). Furthermore, it is
submitted that when a person is acting purely for his own benefit it stands to reason that
just as he gains the benefit of his acts, he should be required to bear the burdens of his
unreasonable and damaging acts. See N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6527(2) (McKinney 1972). For ex-
ample, under the "good samaritan" law, a doctor rendering assistance is held to a higher
degree of care if he is acting for his own benefit. When administering emergency care
outside a hospital or office, a doctor will only be subject to liability if the defendant can
prove gross negligence. Id. Should the doctor exhibit an expectation of compensation, how-
ever, he will be subject to liability for ordinary negligence. Id.
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stronger when the person is acting as a "good samaritan" than
when he is acting for his own gain and thus it would seem easier to
impose a duty in the latter case.2 08 Under the Home Mutual deci-
sion, however, such a duty would be imposed only upon the good
samaritan.
The Home Mutual Court appears to impose a new element in
the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, namely, that a
duty to speak carefully depends upon the presence of a contractual
or legal obligation to make such a representation. In addition to
contradicting established precedent, this misinterpretation effec-
tively moots the negligent misrepresentation cause of action since
the plaintiff who can show the existence of a duty to act can, of
course, maintain an action for negligent performance of that
duty.2 9 Thus, while it is uncertain whether the Court will apply its
overbroad reasoning beyond the specific relationship of a premium
finance agency and an insurance company, it is hoped that the
courts will view the Home Mutual decision as a sign of the Court's
commitment to promoting premium finance agencies and not as
precedent on the elements of negligent misrepresentation.
Matthew J. McMahon
210 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 176, § 56, at 343-48. Dean Prosser noted the
inequities of holding one who acts gratuitously to a duty of care stating, "[t]he result of all
this is that the good Samaritan who tries to help may find himself mulcted in damages,
while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other side go on their cheerful way
rejoicing." Id. at 344. While this may appear inequitable, Dean Prosser further notes that
the person is only required to act reasonably under the circumstances. Id. at 348.
202 Whenever there is a contractual or legal duty to act, the plaintiff can bring an action
for the negligent performance of that duty. See note 202 supra. In such cases the plaintiff
need not resort to an action for negligent misrepresentation, although it may present an
easier burden of proof. Id.
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